Introduction
New York City's "stop and frisk program" is a police strategy whereby pedestrian are briefly stopped by police officers, and potentially searched. The stop and frisk program has given rise to widespread allegations of racial profiling. 1 The racial impact of the program has given rise to public protests 2 and to much social activism, including even a dedicated activist website.
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The media have reported widely on this issue. Figure 1 reports the monthly number of New York Times articles which dealt with stop and frisk.
The stop and frisk program has been repeatedly challenged in court. In the most recent such lawsuit, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin said that that the case involved "an issue of great public concern," namely "the disproportionate number of blacks and Latinos, as compared to whites, who become entangled in the criminal justice system." 
The Data
We use data collected by the NYPD on individual stops, questionings and frisks in the City of New York between 2003-2011. 5 The database contains information on whether the person was frisked, issued a summons or arrested, the type of crime which is ascertained, the race of the pedestrian, the timing and location of the stop. We restrict the sample to black and white pedestrians, setting Hispanics aside, because the charge of racial bias seems to have special force with reference to the African American population. In this restricted sample 5 The database can be downloaded at the following link: http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis and planning/ 2 of 2,600,929 stops, approximately 6 percent of the stopped pedestrinas were arrested and 84 percent of the stops are of black pedestrians, the rest of whites. Most of of the crimes fall into one of these categories: Possession of a Weapon (27%); Robbery (16%); Rent Gouging (12%); Grand Larceny Auto (9.3%); Burglary (8.7%).
6 Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics.
A possible caveat regarding these data is that NYPD officers are not required to record all interactions with private citizens. NYPD policy prescribes the completion of a stop and frisk report (UF-250 form) only under the following circumstances: a person is stopped by use of force; a person stopped is frisked or searched; a person is arrested, or a person stopped refused to identify himself (and was later identified by the officer). 7 Stops which occurred but did not give rise to one of these outcomes need not be recorded. Therefore, recorded stops (the ones in our database) may be a selected sample of all stops.
Nevertheless, we think there is reason to trust the sample somewhat as being representative of all stops. This is because 35% of the stops in our data were recorded despite not resulting in any of the outcomes that legally trigger the requirement to record the stop. 8 This suggest that officers may have an incentive to record stops, perhaps as a way of demonstrating productivity to their supervisors. To the extent that this incentive results in most stops being recorded, the data set is representative of all the stops in New York City.
It is tempting to attempt to address the selective recording concern by restricting the sample 6 Other crimes are: Grand Larceny (4.1%); Illegal Possession of Substances (3.8%); Marihuana (3.8%); Assault (3.2%); Illegal Sales of Substances (3.1%); Petit Larceny (2.5%); Mischief (1.2%); Graffiti (1.1%).
7 See Chapter 5 of the US Commission for Civili Rights Report (USCCR 2010). 8 The outcome "refused to identify" is not recorded in the data. We proxy for it using the field "evasive response to questioning." to stops that are required by law to be recorded. Within this sample, the problem of selective recording should not exist. The trouble with this strategy is that, at the time of choosing whom to stop, the officer cannot distinguish whether the stop will develop into one that has to be recorded or not. Therefore, as we will discuss below, our analysis cannot meaningfully be applied to this subsample. For this reason we will utilize the full sample of all stops in the database. analysis focuses on documenting disparities in impact, but they address racial animus in their Section 5.3. They tentatively conclude that police were indeed racially biased against blacks. This tentative conclusion is based on the statistical fact that blacks were less likely than whites to be arrested conditional on being stopped. This fact is informative about the bias of the police officer choosing whom to stop. Indeed, an officer who was not biased against blacks, and was motivated by the prospect of making an arrest, should cut down on less-productive stops of blacks and increase the more-productive stops of whites. A perfectly unbiased police force would generate equal arrest rates ("hit rates") between the stops of white and black pedestrians. Conversely, a disparity in hit rates across races is indicative of bias against the race that is least likely to produce a "hit" for the officer.
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This argument based on the productivity of stops, and the associated statistical test, are referred to as "hit rates analysis" and were introduced in the policing context by Knowles
11,12
A previously unexplored issue in this literature is whether the hit rates analysis can be carried out on a subsample of all stops, where the subsample is selected based on the information acquired after the pedestrian has been stopped. We argue that it cannot. This is because the information that is used to exclude some of the stops is not available to the officer at the time of the stop-the officer has no way to distinguish in-and out of-sample stops. Conditioning our analysis on such ex-post information would mean conditioning on information Childers (2012) . Also, Anwar and Fang (2006) importantly extend the hit rate analysis. 12 The hit rates analysis is also robust to the presence of information which is used by the police officer to identify whom to stop, but which is unobserved by the econometrician. See Persico (2009) for a discussion of this point.
6 not possessed by the officer at the time of the stop. Put differently, the outcomes contained this restricted data set would not correspond to the outcomes generated by an officer's decision problem at the time of the stop. Thus the hit rate analysis cannot properly be applied to such a subsample. Consequently the subsample of stops that are required by law to be recorded, which was mentioned in Section 2, cannot be the object of hit rate analysis. 13 First, few (only 6%) of the persons stopped are actually arrested. Second, there is a racial disparity in arrest rates: 1 in 15 whites stopped were arrested, compared with approximately 1 in 17 blacks. To gauge the statistical significance of this disparity, in Table 2 we regress the percent probability of being arrested on an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. Depending on the specification, black pedestrians who are stopped are between 0.338% and 0.356% less likely to be arrested compared to whites. (Whites have 13 
Importance of Conditioning on Precincts in Hit Rates

Details in Section 2
about a 6% probability of being arrested). Although the difference is very small, and perhaps unlikely to be perceived by an officer based on his own experience alone, the difference is significant in two out of three specifications. Thus like in Gelman et al. (2007) , in our sample, too, black pedestrians can be significantly (in a statistical sense) less likely to be arrested then whites conditional on being stopped. Estimates are on 76 precincts. The dependent variable is the probability of being arrested conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 7, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Columns 3, 5-7, shows show clustered standard errors at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
However, we need to be careful in interpreting the outcome of this test as evidence of police bias against blacks. This test masks heterogeneity in arrest rates across precincts. Figure   2 shows that precincts vary considerably in the likelihood that a stop translates into an arrest. This heterogeneity might lead to a fallacy in aggregation.
To see this fallacy, consider precincts as separate jurisdictions, so that an officer from one precinct cannot stop pedestrians in another precinct.
14 If the police officers in each precinct were unbiased, then within each precinct the arrest rates of black and white pedestrians stopped should be the same. However, the levels of these arrest rates need not all be the same across precincts. 15 For example, suppose hypothetically that of all the blacks and whites stopped in the Bronx 3% were arrested, and 6% of the blacks and whites stopped in the Financial District were arrested. If we aggregated the data from the two precincts we would mistakenly conclude that the police officers making the stops are biased against blacks, because in the aggregate sample most blacks are searched in the Bronx and have a 3% arrest 15 Figure 2 which reports the arrest rates by precinct, shows that indeed precincts have very different "baseline" arrest rates. This suggests that the "separate jurisdictions" story is valid and that it is necessary to control for precinct fixed effects.
rate, much lower than whites, most of which are searched in the Financial District. Thus the hit rate test carried out without controlling for precincts would be potentially biased, or more precisely, uninformative about the racial bias exhibited by police officers within each precinct.
A solution to this aggregation problem is to introduce precinct-level fixed effects in the statistical model that predicts arrest rates. In the above hypothetical example, introducing precinct-level fixed effects into the baseline specification allows the fixed effects to absorb the 3% and 6% baseline arrest rates, while the coefficient on "black " would be estimated to equal zero. This zero coefficient would properly be interpreted as evidence that the police is not biased. Conversely, if the police were biased then we would observe lower arrest rates on black searchees in many or all precincts, and this black-white difference in arrest rates would be picked up by the coefficient on "black,"after controlling for precinct-level fixed effects.
Therefore, controlling for precinct fixed effects is necessary for the hit rates test to function properly.
In columns 4-7 of Table 2 we run the same OLS regression, this time introducing 76 precinctslevel fixed effects. Notably, the coefficient on "black" changes sign. Now, stopping a black pedestrian results in a probability of arrest which is larger by 0.388% to 0.414% compared to a white pedestrian. Our estimates also suggest that the precincts fixed effects are jointly explaining, in statistical terms, the arrest rate (i.e., the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero reported in Table 2 less than 5%).
That is, after accounting for the fact that different precincts have different "baseline" rates of arrest conditional on search, blacks are no longer less likely to be arrested conditional on being searched. Therefore, introducing precinct-fixed effects overturns the result: the hit rates analysis provides no evidence that the individual police officers who make the decision to stop this or that pedestrian, are biased against blacks. This is the main message of this analysis. 16 6 Discussion Concerning our Choice of Outcome 6.1 Validity of Arrest as an Outcome Gelman et al. (2007) raise the concern that arrests might not be a suitable outcome for hit rates analysis. The ideal outcome is a measure of productivity which the officer legitimately maximizes, and which is itself "objective," that is, cannot be affected by police bias. Arrests might not be "objective" because they might be subject to police discretion, and thus may themselves be tainted by police bias. For example the police may be more likely, all else equal, to arrest a black than a white pedestrian after having stopped either. This is a valid concern which might invalidate the hit rates test.
We address this concern by looking at the officer's behavior after the stop has been made.
We check whether, given the type of crime ascertained by the police officer after the stop, the officer is more likely to arrest a black than a white pedestrian. If the police use discretion in their decision to arrest, and this discretion is correlated with race, then we would expect to see blacks being arrested more often than whites for the same type of crime.
To implement this test, we check whether the race of the person stopped predicts the probability of arrest, after conditioning on the type of crime (as recorded by the officer on Form UF-250). Table 3 presents the results. Estimates are on 76 precincts. The dependent variable is the probability of being arrested conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. All the regressions include 13 indicators of the type of crime representing 95% of the crimes (as recorded by the officer on Form UF-250). To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 3, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
After controlling for the type of crime committed, the estimates suggests that there is no evidence of a significant race effect on arrest. We interpret this result as evidence that, given a certain crime committed by a pedestrian of either race, officers are not using discretion in deciding whom to arrest, or at least, that any discretion they use is uncorrelated with race. Therefore, we conclude the outcome "arrest" is an outcome that can properly be used to carry out the hit rates test. 18 
Alternative Outcome: Summons
Presumably, issuing a summons is a lesser or secondary goal for a police officer compared to an arrest. Nevertheless, issuing a summons does make the stop to some extent successful, or productive. Therefore, in Appendix, Table A .2 we perform the hit rate test on the outcome "summons issued." The results are the opposite of Table 2 : after controlling for precincts, the sign on "black" switches and becomes negative. 19 The interpretation, according to the hit rate analysis, would be that officers are biased against blacks in their decision to stop if officers only cared about issuing a summons. But, clearly officers care about both issuing a summons and making an arrest. 20 Mathematically, the officer's payoff from a stop can be conceptualized as follows:
where I arrest and I summons are indicators taking value 1 if the pedestrian is arrested or issued a summons, respectively. We do not know the actual value of α. If α is close to zero then 18 We also repeat the analysis discussed in the previous section in the subsample of stop and frisk for which we have the data on crimes. The evidence remains consistent with previous findings of no discrimination and is available upon request.
19 Table A .3 in the appendix corresponds to Table 3 and gives a similar result: given a certain crime committed by a pedestrian of either race, officers are not using discretion in favor of whites when deciding whom to issue a summons to. In fact, blacks appear to be issues summons less often than whites. Therefore, we see no evidence that any police discreation which might affect the outcome "summons" is biased against blacks.
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13 the payoff π (α) will closely mimic the variable "summons;" vice versa, when α is close to one then the payoff π (α) will be close to the variable "arrests."
What happens if we run the hit rate test on the outcome variable π (α)? Will the police look biased against blacks or against whites? This depends on the value of α. If α is close to zero then we know from Table A.2 in the appendix that the police will look biased against blacks. If α is close to one then Table 2 says that the police are biased against whites. We have performed a search for the threshold value α such that the police looks unbiased. This threshold value is α = 0.82. At this value, the police values each arrest equal to about four summons. For any value of α larger than 0.82, that is, if the police officers value arrest more than four summons, then the hit rate test would conclude that the police is not biased against blacks. For any value smaller than 0.82, then the hit rate test would conclude that the police is not biased against whites. We regard a "value ratio" of 4 or more summons per arrest as a plausible one.
Bias in Manpower Allocation Across Precincts?
Our tests in Section 5 (columns 4-7 in Table 2 ) have shown that individual officers are not biased against blacks in selecting which pedestrians to stop. This suggests that no bias is present at the within-precinct level. Is there any impermissible behavior going on at a different level, i.e., in the cross-precinct resource allocation? In this section we examine this question.
Let's start with disparate impact. In our data we find evidence of disparate impact in the cross-district resource allocation. Precincts with a higher fraction of black residents experience a higher police pressure per capita (correlation coefficient 0.39).
21 Is this disparity evidence of bias, or impermissible behavior?
Any discussion of bias has to start with identifying a legally "permissible" objective or motive for the police, which defines what is unbiased behavior. Deviations from this behavior can be classified as biased. In the case of a police chief or other central authority allocating resources across districts, it seems reasonable to define this objective as the minimization of crime. 22 If we make this assumption, then we might conceptualize the "legally permissible version" of the police chief's problem as follows:
where p i represents the number of police officers assigned to precinct i, P represents the total amount of police officers available to the police chief, and the function C i (·) represents the crime rate (per capita) in precinct i. According to this formulation, the legally permissible objective of the police chief is to minimize the sum of (per capita) crime rates across all precincts.
If this is a legally permissible objective, what would be the corresponding impermissible, or biased, version? Perhaps one in which we allow the police chief to "prioritize" different precincts. This can be conceptualized by assigning different weights to the crime rates of different precincts. Then, a potentially biased police chief would solve the followin problem:
where β i is the weight assigned to precinct i.
The difficulty with this conceptualization is that one might be ambivalent about whether the configuration β i > β j represents bias in favor or against precinct i. On the one hand, β i > β j means that precinct i's crime rate is more salient than precinct j's, and accordingly, more resources will proportionally be devoted to precinct i, resulting in a lower crime rate in that precinct. On the other hand, β i > β j means that precinct i will be assigned more police officers, so more stops and more frisks, which some civil liberty advocates object to. So, it is conceptually/normatively ambiguous whether β i > β j means that precinct i is favored or disfavored relative to precinct j.
Apart from the above conceptual/normative ambiguity, there is also an empirical difficulty in estimating the (unobserved) weights β i . To see the nature of this difficulty, let us derive the equilibrium predictions which would allow us to estimate the weights. The first order conditions necessary for optimality in problem (1) are:
where p * i and p * j represent the optimal allocation. This equation shows that in order to recover the ratios β i /β j we need to observe the ratio of elasticities of crime to policing,
The difficulty is that whereas it might be possible to observe the equilibrium levels of crime rates C i (p * i ), it is much harder to get persuasive estimates of their elasticities
) . An elasticity captures a counterfactual: what would happen to the crime rate if the police chief happened to perturb the allocation of manpower from its equilibrium level. In other words, estimating elasticities requires observing more than simply equilibrium levels of crime. This is an empirical challenge.
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The takeaway from this section is that identifying bias in the allocation of manpower across precincts is difficult for two reasons. The first difficulty is of a "normative" nature, and it has to do with what it means for an allocation to be biased against a precinct. The second difficulty is that it is difficult to obtain empirical estimates of the weights β i in problem (1).
Conclusions
Former New York City's police commissioner William Bratton said: "Stop-and-frisk is not something you can stop. It is an absolutely basic tool of American policing. 25 " If stop and frisk cannot be stopped, then it becomes especially important to ensure that this program is carried out in a racially unbiased way. We have analyzed data on NYPD's "stop and frisk
program" in an effort to identify racial bias on the part of the police officers making the stops.
Once we control for precincts, white pedestrians are slightly less likely than african-american pedestrians to be arrested conditional on being stopped. We interpret this fact as evidence 24 See Persico (2009) for a discussion of the kind of statistical variation that would permit the identification of the weights β i .
25 The Wall Street Journal, "The Real Cures for Gun Violence" by David Feith. January 19-20, 2013. that the officers are not biased against African Americans relative to whites, because the latter are being stopped despite being a "less productive stop" for a police officer. According to this interpretation, the small differential in probability of arrest represents a slight bias against white pedestrians.
In our view, the observed differential across races in the productivity (probability of arrest) of a stop should not be overinterpreted. Indeed its size is small. According to our estimate, after controlling for precinct, stopping a white motorist is only marginally less likely to result in arrest (4/10 of a percentage point). Such a small difference might be difficult for a police officer to detect based on his own personal experience. If that is the case, and police officers cannot distinguish the average productivities of black v. white stops, then it is proper to interpret the evidence as consistent with the officers being unbiased. Moreover, if we take into account that issuing a summons is also a productive outcome, albeit a less productive one than an arrest, then it is even easier to rationalize police behavior as unbiased.
Our results cannot be interpreted as proving that the stop and frisk program is lawful. If is possible that the program may be unlawful in other ways, for example, that many of its searches may not arise from a reasonable suspicion. Our interpretation of the results is simply that, whether or not the officers behavior violates the law, the behavior does not display a racial bias, conscious or not.
A different question is whether bias may be found in the allocation of officers across precincts.
In Section 7 we have suggested a framework for thinking through what bias might mean in the context of such an allocation problem. Our view is that defining such bias presents conceptual difficulties; moreover, identifying it empirically presents additional difficulties.
Appendix A Estimates are on 76 precincts. The dependent variable is the probability of a summons being issued conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 7, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Columns 3, 5-7, shows show clustered standard errors at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). is the probability of a summons being issued conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. All the regressions include 13 indicators of the type of crime representing 95% of the crimes (as recorded by the officer on Form UF-250). To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 3, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Notes. Estimates are on 76 precincts. The dependent variable is (π(α) = α · I arrest + (1 − α) · I summons ) the weighted sum of the probability of being arrested and the probability of a summons being issued conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). The weights (α, 1 − α) are .82 and .18. Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 7, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Columns 3, 5-7, shows show clustered standard errors at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***). Estimates are on 76 precincts. The dependent variable is (π(α) = α · I arrest + (1 − α) · I summons ) the weighted sum of the probability of being arrested and the probability of a summons being issued conditional on being stopped in New York City (in %). The weights (α, 1 − α) are .82 and .18. Black is an indicator variable coding the pedestrian's race. All the regressions include 13 indicators of the type of crime representing 95% of the crimes (as recorded by the officer on Form UF-250). To control for possible time trend in the dependent variable and precincts specific characteristics, when denoted with "yes", regressions additionally include year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). In Column 3, we include interactions between year fixed effects (8 dummies) and precincts fixed effects (75 dummies). Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. P-value of H 0 : u i = 0 is the p-value for the joint test of all the precincts fixed effects equal to zero. Significance at the 10% (*), at the 5% (**), and at the 1% (***).
